LINKAGES BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND TERRORISM

LINKAGES BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND TERRORISM

ROLE OF EXTERNAL STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN CREATING CHALLENGES TO INTERNAL SECURITY

State Actors: External State actors refer to those entities which have the formal backing of a sovereign state for carrying out any intended action. Examples of state actors are the army, bureaucracy, intelligence agencies, etc.

External non-state actors: Organizations and individuals not connected with, directed by, or funded through the government or government organizations are non-state actors. They can be corporations, NGOs, etc.

Challenges posed by external state actors

1. China:
   • Support to extremists in North-East: China has provided financial support, arms, and sanctuaries to Naga, Mizo, and Meitei extremists.
     • For example: ULFA members of Assam were given shelter by China.
   • Philosophical and moral support: The Naxalite movement, based on the ideology of Mao Zedong, the influential Chinese leader, also enjoys philosophical, moral, financial, and intellectual support from China.
   • Cyberattacks: Chinese government-linked companies are attempting to monitor the digital footprint of several Indian citizens; targeting India’s power infrastructure through malware threats. (Reported by US-based cybersecurity firm Recorded Future).
2. Pakistan:
   • Proxy-wars: Recognizing that it cannot defeat India in traditional warfare, Pakistan has been indulging in proxy-wars by supporting many non-state actors, including terrorist organizations and crime syndicates.
   • Economic challenges: Fake currency rackets run by Pakistan are a part of its state policy “to bleed India through a thousand cuts.”

 

Challenges posed by external non-state actors

• Left-wing extremism: LWE (Left Wing Extremism) movements led by Maoist groups like CPI (Maoist) affect states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, etc., posing social, economic, and political challenges. (Discussed in detail under the article on Left Wing Extremism).
• Insurgency: Insurgency in Northeast India involves multiple armed separatist factions based on ethnicity operating in India’s north-eastern states. (Discussed in detail under the article on North-East Insurgency; Jammu and Kashmir Insurgency).
• Terrorism: Non-state actors, motivated by religious ideologies, have emerged as a constant threat across the nation and not just in Jammu and Kashmir. It not only creates instability in a particular region but also spreads panic across the nation.
• Organized crime: Situated between the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent, India faces the challenges of drug trafficking. Apart from it, other crimes such as human trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, etc., also pose challenges to India’s internal security. (Discussed in detail under the article on Organized Crime).
• Communalism: Propaganda is run and funded by enemy countries and other non-state actors to destabilize the country by damaging the socio-religious fabric and ensuring riots.
• Radicalization: External non-state actors such as terrorist groups, overground workers, etc., have been involved in radicalizing the youth and thereby posing internal security challenges for India.

 

RADICALIZATION

It is a process by which a person accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective. It generates a separatist, exclusivist, orthodox, rigid, and hateful mindset, which is highly detrimental to communal harmony and peace.

Types of radicalism:

1. Right-wing extremism: This form of radicalization is characterized by the violent defense of a racial, ethnic, or pseudo-national identity. It is also associated with radical hostility towards minorities, immigrants, and/or left-wing political groups.
2. Politico-religious extremism: This is associated with a political interpretation of religion and uses violence to protect a religious identity perceived to be under attack.
3. Left-wing extremism: It focuses on anti-capitalist demands and calls for the transformation of political systems considered responsible for producing social inequalities. This category includes anarchists, Maoists, etc., who use violence to advocate for their cause.
4. Single-issue extremism: This is essentially motivated by specific issues and includes radical environmental or animal rights groups, anti-abortion extremists, certain anti-gay/anti-feminist movements, etc., which use violence to promote their causes.
5. Internet Radicalization: The internet is used by terrorists as an effective tool for radicalization and terror financing. Terror groups utilize the internet to advocate violence in furtherance of religious, ideological, or political causes.

 

Factors facilitating radicalism:

1. Relational: Family disaffiliation, network of contacts in radical circles, and distancing from friend circles.
2. Personal: Troubled adolescence or difficult transitions to adulthood, difficult life events (e.g., the death of loved ones), existential crises, peer pressure, thrill-seeking attitudes.
3. Social identity: Social isolation, a sense of discrimination, and perception of injustice due to one’s belief/religion.
4. Psychological: Mental disorders, distress, etc.
5. External factors: Polarized society, sensationalized public and media discourse, and easy access to extremist propaganda and discourse.
6. Other factors:
   • Radicalization in prisons: Prisons provide a unique environment where individuals can spread extreme ideologies. Conditions inside prisons can exacerbate or create animosities.
   • Unemployment: Unemployment provides fertile ground for recruitment by violent extremist organizations as they offer routes out of poverty. For example: ISIL offers its fighters $500 a month, which acts as an attractive inducement to uneducated, unskilled, rural, and unemployed individuals (UNDP report).
   • Growing diversity: It can arouse feelings of fear and anger. For instance, benefits previously granted to a particular group or community may now be distributed among larger groups.

 

Challenges in addressing radicalism:

• Absence of an official policy on radicalization and de-radicalization.
• Compartmentalized mindset of the agencies due to which the problem is viewed from a security perspective, rather than a rehabilitative, reformative, and preventive approach, which is the need of the hour.
• Availability of material: Radical content, primarily disseminated through the internet, cannot be limited by artificial political boundaries.
• Legislative competence: Law and order is a state subject, and each state is free to determine its own course of action.
• Difficult to understand: The thought process of an individual and how the information given to them is perceived.
• Lack of awareness: Among parents and teachers often leads to ignoring the early signs of such development.

 

Government initiative

• Counter Terrorism and Counter Radicalisation: Set up in 2017 under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the CTCR division is mandated with the “development of policy and strategies to counter radicalisation.”

 

Way forward

• Evidence-based policy making: Any policy or programme regarding radicalisation must be based on objective empirical evidence and not merely subjective experiences.
• Umbrella legislation: The Centre should develop an umbrella legal framework aimed at facilitating, guiding, and coordinating the efforts of individual states to combat radicalisation.
• Empowering individuals: To better deal with feelings of relative deprivation and injustice, individuals should be empowered by increasing their perceptions of efficacy and self-esteem and fostering the creation of a strong self-identity.
• A consistent counter-radical strategy: Required to tackle radicalism.
• Strengthening institutions: Educational and political institutions should be strengthened so that people feel empowered.
• Intelligence strengthening: Central agencies like RAW and IB should conduct covert operations to understand extremist propaganda and frame strategies to regulate the actions of radicalized youth.
• Regulating social media: Develop legal guidelines to regulate information-sharing activities without infringing on the privacy of individuals.

 

Best practices

1. ‘De-radicalisation’ programme of Maharashtra: More than a hundred individuals have been de-radicalized. The programme focuses on four aspects of the individual—family, religion, and psychology—and seeks to bring about a lasting change in the individual’s belief system.
2. Kerala’s ‘Operation Pigeon’: The state claims to have “counselled” 350 youths by mining social media.

 

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM

Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) is the official name for the insurrection in Indian states. It is also popularly called “Naxalism” or “Maoism.” Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described the problem as the single biggest internal security challenge of the country in 2006.

They are the group of people who believe in the political theory derived from the teachings of the Chinese political leader Mao Zedong. The Naxals strongly believe that the solution to social and economic discrimination is to overthrow the existing political system

Data LWE incidents: LWE-related incidents were reduced by 47% between 2015 and 2020, compared to incidents in the preceding six years (2009–2014). Geographical spread of Naxal violence: The geographical spread of Naxal violence was contained to 53 districts across 9 states in 2020 compared to 76 districts across 10 states in 2013. Fatalities in incidents related to Maoists (2005–18): Civilians: 6,279 Security personnel: 1,959 Maoists: 2,793

 

Phases of Left-Wing Extremism in India

Phase I: (1967–75) In 1967, the Naxalbari uprising started as a class conflict between peasants and landlords. CPI (ML): Under the leadership of Charu Majumdar, a new party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), was formed in 1969. This movement was deeply motivated and influenced by the Communist Party of China. Opposition to Electoral Process: The CPI (ML) opposed elections, advocating violent revolution as the only way to achieve its goals. 1974: After Charu Majumdar’s death, the CPI (ML) lost its credible leadership, eventually reborn as CPI (ML) Liberation in 1974. 1975: During the Emergency, the movement faced a severe setback with approximately 40,000 cadres imprisoned.

Phase II: (1975–2000) Expansion Strategy: The movement grew significantly, spreading from West Bengal to Bihar, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh. Emergence of Maoist Factions: People’s War Group (PWG): Formed in Andhra Pradesh in 1980 by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, a key Naxalite leader. Objective of PWG: Influenced by Mao Tse Tung’s ideology, focusing on organized peasant insurrections and rejecting parliamentary democracy. Advocates capturing political power through protracted armed struggles and guerrilla warfare.

Phase III: (Post – 2000) Formation of People’s Guerrilla Army: Marked the third phase of the movement with intensified militancy. 2004: PWG merged with Maoist Communist Centre, forming CPI (Maoist). CPI (Maoist): Became the most prominent LWE group, responsible for violent incidents and killings of civilians and security forces. Included under the Schedule of Terrorist Organizations in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Spread: The movement expanded to cover 233 districts across 20 states during this phase.

Reasons for the Naxalite Movement

1. Historical reasons: Evolution of the modern nation-state and cultural appropriation of disadvantaged sections of society, especially Adivasis.
2. Economic reasons:
   • Rising inequality: The unevenness of India’s development process has led to interregional divides, rural-urban divides, and inter-sectoral divides.
   • Land-related issues:
     • Failure of land reforms (e.g., evasion of land ceiling laws).
     • Poor implementation of laws prohibiting the transfer of tribal land to non-tribals under the Fifth Schedule.
     • Existence of special land tenures (e.g., exemptions under ceiling laws).
     • Encroachment and occupation of government and community lands (including water bodies) by powerful sections of society.
     • Lack of title to public land cultivated by the landless poor.
   • Employment-related issues:
     • Disruption of traditional occupations and lack of alternative work opportunities.
     • Deprivation of traditional rights in common property resources.
3. Social reasons:
   • Denial of justice: Denial of dignity and prevalence of practices like untouchability. Poor implementation of laws on prevention of atrocities, protection of civil rights, and abolition of bonded labor.
   • Brainwashed locals: Many recruits to LWE groups come from marginalized backgrounds or regions disaffected by uneven economic growth.
   • Tribal alienation: Deep-rooted alienation among tribal communities due to systemic neglect.
4. Governance-related issues:
   • Malgovernance: Lack of effective governance mechanisms exacerbates the discontent among marginalized communities.
   • Issues with Public Personnel: Incompetent, ill-trained, and poorly motivated public personnel who are mostly absent from their place of posting.

• Misuse of powers by the police and violations of norms of law.
• Issues with local government:
  • Perversion of electoral politics.
  • Unsatisfactory functioning of local government institutions.
• Diversion of Resources: Corruption and poor provision/non-provision of essential public services, including primary healthcare and education.
• Lack of Coordination: Between the union government and state governments, as well as differences in policies between states, which continue to pursue divergent policies against Naxalism.
• Displacement and Forced Evictions: Large-scale land acquisition and displacement for “public purposes” without appropriate compensation or rehabilitation.
• Tri-Junction Theory: Areas located at the tri-junction of three states face governance issues, poor transportation, lack of communication, and inadequate infrastructure.
  • Example: Dandakaranya forest.

• Security Issues

• Lack of Trust: Central forces such as CRPF were found to be operating without much guidance from local police.
• No National Approach: In the absence of a nationwide approach, success against Naxalism remains elusive. Police being a state subject leads to different approaches.
• Negligence of Established Standard Operating Procedures: This often results in the loss of valuable lives of security personnel.
  • Example: 2014 attack in Sukma and 2016 in Dantewada, which resulted in the loss of lives of CRPF personnel.
• Deputation Issues: Structural deficits such as placing IPS officers on deputation in CRPF, ignoring the decades of experience within the force.
• Lack of Modernization: Modernization and capacity-building of police forces have been slow, impacting their ability to combat Naxals.
  • Example: In Chhattisgarh, there are about 10,000 vacancies in state police, and 23 sanctioned police stations are yet to be set up.

• Naxal-Related Issues

• Use of Technology by Naxals: Example: In 2019, Naxals used a drone to fly over a paramilitary base of CRPF. In April 2021, Naxals claimed to have shot down drones operated by security forces that were sent to “bomb” them.
• Political-Naxal Nexus: Historical nexus between political leaders and Maoists. Example: Recent arrests of leaders from Chhattisgarh.
• Ideological Basis: Ideological foundations reject India’s Constitution and democracy, exalting Maoist variants of communism, perpetuating Naxalism.
• Financial Interest: Maoist influence thrives in mineral-rich regions and forests. Natural resource exploitation offers high-profit margins for contractors, with Maoists extorting money under the guise of protecting local interests.
• Female Combatants’ Specific Reasons:
  • Sexual Assault: Crimes against women are more rampant in Maoist-affected areas. Women face sexual harassment from both the state and insurgents, with limited avenues for justice.
  • High Death Rate: Within the rebellion, SC/ST women form 40% of the forces but constitute 90% of its martyrs.
  • High Displacement Rate: SC/ST women suffer disproportionately due to mass displacement and the loss of livelihood.
  • Relief from Poverty: Marginalization in rural economies renders women poorer than men, pushing them to perceive Maoism as a relief from unemployment and poverty.

• Other Issues

• Brainwashing: Maoists coerced Adivasi parents into parting with girls to brain-wash and indoctrinate young women with Maoist ideology to form “Bal Dastas.”
• Geographical Factors: The terrain in these areas is suitable for guerrilla tactics and reduces the reach and spread of governmental programs.
• Lack of Political Will: This is caused by the federal structure and the differing political agendas of parties at the Center and the states, which hinder a unified approach to addressing Naxalism.

 

Government Measures

1. Security and Institutional Measures

• Operation Steeplechase (1971): A joint Army-CRPF Police operation that led to the crackdown on many Naxalites.
• Operation Green-Hunt (2009): Deployment of COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) against Naxals, popularly known as Operation Green Hunt.
• Unified Command (2010): Established by the government for inter-state coordination, focusing on intelligence gathering, information sharing, and police responses across Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and West Bengal.
• State Measures:
  • Black Panther Combat Force: A specialized anti-Naxal combat force in Chhattisgarh, modeled after Greyhounds in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.
  • Bastariya Battalion: A newly formed CRPF battalion comprising over 534 tribal youth from Naxal-infested districts in Chhattisgarh, with adequate female representation.
  • Greyhound Force: Andhra Pradesh’s specialized commando force to tackle Left-Wing Extremism (LWE).
• National Investigation Agency (NIA): A separate vertical in the NIA has been initiated to investigate cases related to LWE.
• Multi-Disciplinary Groups: Formed by the Ministry of Home Affairs with officers from agencies such as IB, NIA, CBI, ED, and DRI, along with state police, to disrupt Maoist funding.
• Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme: A sub-scheme under the “Modernization of Police Forces” umbrella. It reimburses training and operational needs to the state governments of 11 LWE-affected states.
• Scheme of Fortified Police Stations: Sanctioned construction of 400 fortified police stations in 10 LWE-affected states. Of these, 399 have been completed.

2. Skill Development Measures

• Roshni Initiative: A program under the Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana to train and place rural poor youth from 27 LWE-affected districts.
• Skill Development in 34 Districts: Aims to establish ITIs (Industrial Training Institutes) and skill development centers in LWE-affected districts.

3. Infrastructure Development

• Special Infrastructure Scheme: Includes the construction of fortified police stations in LWE-affected states.
• Road Requirement Plan-I (RRP-I): Focuses on improving road connectivity in 34 LWE-affected districts across 8 states (e.g., Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh).
• Road Connectivity Project for LWE-Affected Areas (RRP-II): Approved for enhancing road connectivity in 44 districts of 9 LWE-affected states.
• LWE Mobile Tower Project: Aims to improve mobile connectivity in LWE areas, with over 2,343 mobile towers already installed and operational.

Developmental Measures

1. Forest Rights Act, 2006: Recognizes the rights of scheduled tribes and forest dwellers over land and forest resources.
2. Additional Central Assistance (ACA) for LWE-Affected Districts: Aims to provide public infrastructure and services in LWE-affected areas.
3. Civic Action Programme: Designed to build bridges between the local population and security forces. Encourages the effective implementation of the PESA (Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, prioritizing rights over minor forest produce for Gram Sabhas.
4. Approval of Projects under Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF): Provides mobile services in 96 districts of LWE-affected states.
5. Special Central Assistance (SCA): Targeted at the 30 most LWE-affected districts, focusing on filling critical gaps in public infrastructure and services.
6. Assistance to Central Agencies for LWE Management Scheme: Supports central agencies (e.g., CAPFs, IAF) by strengthening infrastructure and providing funding for helicopter hiring.
7. Media Plan: Implements initiatives like Tribal Youth Exchange programs, radio jingles, documentaries, and pamphlets to spread awareness in LWE-affected areas.
8. Aspirational Districts Program: Monitored by the Ministry of Home Affairs, it focuses on improving development metrics in 35 LWE-affected districts.
9. SAMADHAN Initiative: Stands for:
   • S – Smart Leadership
   • A – Aggressive Strategy
   • M – Motivation and Training
   • A – Actionable Intelligence
   • D – Dashboard-Based KPIs and KRAs (Key Result Areas)
   • H – Harnessing Technology
   • A – Action Plans for each theatre
   • N – No Access to Financing for insurgents
10. Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan (RMSA): Upgraded 1,590 schools and sanctioned 350 girls’ hostels in 35 most LWE-affected districts.
11. “Lon Varattu” (Return Home) Campaign: Launched in Bastar’s Dantewada district, this campaign encourages Naxal foot soldiers and sympathizers to surrender and join the mainstream.

 

Way Forward

1. Policy Measures

• Strong Political Will: Unified political consensus is essential for combating Maoist violence. The Center should take the lead.
• Dialogue: Establish peace dialogues with Naxal groups willing to shun violence under favorable local conditions.
• Strengthening Administrative Machinery: Make governance more responsive, transparent, and sensitive to effectively address public grievances.
• Improved Delivery Mechanisms: Focus on integrated development and creating employment opportunities in Naxal-affected districts.
• Inter-State Coordination: Station inter-state coordination committees in affected regions for unified operations.

2. Security Measures

• Strengthening State Police Forces: Local police should lead operations, supported with enhanced resources and manpower.
• National Policy: Develop a unified national policy to address Naxalism from developmental, economic, and security perspectives.
• Sensitization of Armed Forces: Educate armed forces on tribal lifestyles and grievances to improve understanding of ground realities and aid strategy formulation.

 

Security Measures

• Strengthen Police Stations: Focus on enhancing police stations and forces, such as recent government schemes for fortified police stations.
• Peace Battalions: Some battalions should be earmarked as “peace battalions” by the states to provide security to development projects in the affected areas.
• Training: Seek the Army’s help in training battalions for counter-insurgency operations.
• Building Local Capabilities: Improve intelligence gathering and sharing mechanisms in affected states.
• Procedural and Technological Solutions: Utilize micro or mini-UAVs (drones) to minimize the loss of security personnel lives.
• Integrated Approach: Counter-offensive operations led by disciplined commando forces of the state police. Expand road networks, mobile communication, and economic activities to foster development in affected regions.

 

Developmental Issues

• Rehabilitation Issues: Address pending rehabilitation and resettlement cases in LWE-affected areas to build confidence among affected citizens.
• Provide Dues to Locals: Spend royalty charges from the exploitation of local natural resources on local development in true spirit.
• Maintenance of Land Records and Justice Delivery: Fear of land alienation is a key reason for tribal distrust. Proper maintenance of land records can help mitigate this issue.
• Coordination Between Center and States: Ensure the Center plays a supportive role while state police forces take the lead in operations.
• Social Media: Use psychological operations through social media as a major component of security measures.
• Socio-Economic Issues: Address the basic issues of socio-economic rights, tribal livelihoods, and speed up development projects in affected areas.

 

Other Issues

• Block Funding: Break the nexus between illegal mining/forest contractors and extremists through special anti-extortion and anti-money laundering cells established by the state police.

 

Best Practices

1. Sandesh (Bihar): Regular panchayat elections created a significant distance between Naxal leaders and local communities, forcing many Naxalites to leave their outfits.
2. Aasawar Project in Jehanabad (Bihar): Developmental activities such as constructing cement lanes, link roads, drains, school buildings, anganwadis, and individual toilets helped defeat Naxalism in the region.

 

Conclusion

LWE is not merely a law-and-order problem. It requires a multi-pronged conflict management and resolution strategy. This issue should be addressed holistically through political security, development, public perception management, and surrender and rehabilitation initiatives.

NORTH-EAST INSURGENCY

Northeast India (officially North Eastern Region, NER) is the easternmost region of India, representing both a geographic and political-administrative division of the country comprising eight states. The region shares an international border of 5,182 kilometers (about 99% of its total geographical boundary) with China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan.

 

Data Insurgency-Related Incidents: Insurgency-related incidents in the northeastern states dipped by 80%, and civilian deaths by 99% in 2020 compared to 2014. The number of incidents came down to 162 in 2020 compared to 824 in 2014 (Ministry of Home Affairs data). Deaths: Civilian deaths were in single digits (two) in 2020, the first time since 1999. Deaths of security personnel also decreased by 75%. This improvement is attributed to greater autonomy for ADCs (Autonomous District Councils), devolution of funds, arrests, surrenders, rehabilitation programs, and better monitoring of development schemes. Deaths Between 1992–2015: Over 15,600 fatalities were reported from the northeastern states, with civilians accounting for more than 50% of the total fatalities (Ministry of Home Affairs).

Typology of Conflicts (Based on Second ARC Report)

Conflicts in the northeastern region range from insurgency for secession to demands for autonomy, “sponsored terrorism,” ethnic clashes, and those generated by the continuous inflow of migrants. These can be categorized as:

• National Conflicts: Related to the concept of a distinct “homeland” as a separate nation and the pursuit of this goal by its proponents.
• Ethnic Conflicts: Assertion of numerically smaller and less dominant tribal groups against the political and cultural dominance of larger groups.
  • In Assam, this often involves tensions between local and migrant communities.
• Sub-Regional Conflicts: Movements seeking recognition for sub-regional aspirations, often in direct conflict with state governments or autonomous councils.

 

Militancy in the Northeast

1. Arunachal Pradesh:

• The state remained peaceful after a ceasefire with the NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagaland), which was active in the Tirap District.
• Some disquiet was noted due to the settlement of Chakma refugees from Bangladesh in large numbers, though this has subsided.

2. Assam:

• A wide variety of ethnic conflicts prevail, including agitations against the “influx of foreigners” and perceived inability of the government to deport migrants.
• Continuous migration into Assam after the 1971 war led to the birth of the Assam Movement in the early 1980s, spearheaded by the All Assam Students Union (AASU).
• The movement was later taken over by extremist outfits like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which became active from the 1980s until the late 1990s.

3. Nagaland:

• Originally part of Assam, Nagaland was the first to experience militancy.
• The Nagas, under the leadership of the Naga National Council (NNC), demanded independence from India.
• The NNC later split into different factions, including the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which further divided into NSCN-IM (Isak-Muivah) and NSCN-K (Khaplang) factions.
• These factions have continued separate violent struggles for Nagaland’s independence.

4. Mizoram

• Mizoram was part of Assam until it was granted statehood in 1987. It experienced militancy after the Union government failed to respond to demands for assistance during the “Mautam famine.”
• The Mizo National Front (MNF): Led by legendary leader Laldenga, launched the movement in 1966 demanding independence for Mizoram.

5. Tripura

• Demographic Change: Migration of Hindus from British-ruled East Bengal is believed to have reduced the indigenous tribal population to a minority status.
• Emergence of Militancy:
  • From the 1970s, militant groups demanded restoration of tribal rights from the Bengali population, accused of dominating the political and economic affairs of the state.
  • In 1978, the Tripura National Volunteers was formed and began attacking other ethnic groups.
  • In 1991, the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) began attacks.
  • Violence has since been factionalized, and recent years have seen relative peace.

6. Manipur

• Origin of Militancy: Began as a protest against the forcible merger of the former Manipur Kingdom with India.
• United National Liberation Front (UNLF): Formed in 1964 to end perceived discrimination against Manipur, which was accorded statehood only in 1972, nearly 23 years after its merger.
• Several militant organizations have since emerged, representing various tribes, with some espousing similar causes.

7. Sikkim

• Sikkim has largely avoided major conflicts due to its emphasis on decentralized planning and maintaining a balance between various ethnic groups (mainly Lepchas, Bhutiyas, and Nepalis).

 

Reasons for Insurgency in the North-East

1. Socio-Cultural Reasons

• Multi-Ethnic Region:
  • Myopic Understanding of Tribes: The region is home to over 200 tribes with distinct cultures. The government’s process of “integration” into the mainstream often disregards these differences, leading to insurgencies.
  • Inter-Tribal Rivalries: Tribal and ethnic insurgencies are aggravated by conflicts among tribes.
  • Demographic Changes: The influx of refugees from Bangladesh into Assam has altered the demographic landscape, causing discontent among locals.
  • Cross-Border Ethnic Similarities: Many tribes in the North-East share similarities with tribes across borders. Political and territorial divisions have separated tribes from their kin, creating regional and international tensions.

2. Economic Reasons

• Poor Infrastructure: Difficult terrain and underdeveloped infrastructure have widened the gap between the North-Eastern region and the rest of India, leading to discontent.
• Lack of Economic Development: Economic development in the North-East has lagged, resulting in limited employment opportunities. This makes the youth vulnerable to recruitment by insurgent groups.
• Exploitation of Natural Resources: In oil-rich Assam, militants have periodically targeted oil and gas pipelines for sabotage, alleging that India is exploiting the state’s natural resources.

4. Governance-Related Reasons

• Sense of Isolation, Deprivation, and Exploitation: Distance from mainland India and limited representation in the Lok Sabha reduce the region’s voice in policymaking, leading to disillusionment and making militancy more attractive.
• Perceived Excesses by Indian Army: The promulgation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) alienates the local population. It is often seen as draconian by human rights organizations and vilified by insurgent groups.

 

• Absence of State Protection: With limited protection from the state government, people often bribe militant groups for peace rather than risk death or abduction.
• State of Stable Anarchy: Some parts of the North-East now represent “stable anarchy,” where governance institutions are directly or indirectly subverted to serve personal or partisan agendas (II ARC).
• Issue of Autonomy: Autonomy granted under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution has failed to satisfy due to interference by state and central governments.
  • Example: Three Autonomous District Councils of Meghalaya requested the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes to direct the state government to refrain from interference.
• Slow Policy Measures: National policymaking has not prioritized the North-East.
  • Example: Fencing of the 4,095 km Indo-Bangladesh border, seen as a solution for cross-border militancy and illegal migration, has progressed slowly.

• Other Reasons

• Internal Displacement: From 1990 to 2011, over 8 lakh people were displaced due to inter-ethnic violence in Western Assam.
• External Support: Countries like Pakistan and China have supplied arms, ammunition, and refuge to insurgent groups.
• Tough Terrain and Geographical Challenges: Difficult terrain and weak infrastructure facilitate guerrilla warfare, providing militants an advantage.
• Easy Availability of Weapons and Drugs: Cross-border support and the presence of the “golden triangle” make weapons and drugs easily accessible, enabling the recruitment and indoctrination of youth.
• Growing Capabilities of Groups: Availability of small arms has allowed militant groups to grow into extortion rackets, collecting contributions from the public, businesses, and government employees.
• Lack of Media Attention: The region receives little attention from national or international media, increasing its isolation.
• Transformation into Terrorist Organizations: Many militant outfits in the region have shifted their focus to becoming terrorist entities, abandoning original ideological objectives.
  • Example: Militant outfits in Tripura, including the National Liberation Front of Tripura and All Tripura Tiger Force, have launched attacks on tribal populations.

 

Government Initiatives

1. Constitutional Provisions

• Article 244 (1): Under the Fifth Schedule, administrative control of Scheduled Areas and tribes is ensured.
• Article 244 (2): Under the Sixth Schedule, administrative autonomy is provided for tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram through Autonomous District Councils.

2. Legislative Measures

• Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA): Provides special powers to members of the armed forces in disturbed areas, including Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura.

3. Institutional and Administrative Measures

• Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (DoNER): Responsible for planning, execution, and monitoring development schemes to accelerate socio-economic development in the North-East.
• Inner Line Permit (ILP): Restricts the entry of outsiders to protect the identity of indigenous people in Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh. Entry without ILP is prohibited.

4. Schemes

• Scheme for Surrender-Cum-Rehabilitation of Militants in North-East: Aims to wean away misguided youth and hardcore militants by offering financial incentives, training, and reintegration into society.
• Reimbursement of Security-Related Expenditure (SRE): A central government scheme reimbursing states for security-related expenses in militancy/insurgency-affected areas.
• Civic Action Programme: Includes welfare and developmental activities such as medical camps, sanitation drives, sports meets, distributing educational materials, and minor repairs of infrastructure.
• Modernisation of Police Forces: Focuses on upgrading state police forces to address challenges related to terrorism, naxalism, and insurgency.

• Other Measures

• Resettlement of Bru Migrants in Tripura: Addresses security concerns for the Bru community in Mizoram.
• National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam: Aims to identify and weed out illegal immigrants.
• Banning of Insurgent Groups in the North-East: Declares them unlawful under the UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act) of 1967.
• Constitution of a Multi-Disciplinary Committee: Focuses on developmental needs of Eastern Nagaland.
• Bodo Accord: A tripartite agreement between the central government, Assam government, and Bodo groups to end a 50-year crisis.
• Ceasefire Agreement: Signed with NSCN-IM (National Socialist Council of Nagaland) to halt hostilities.

 

Way Forward

1. Military Action

• Continued Military Operations Against Select Insurgent Groups: Indian Army should target groups unwilling to engage in peace talks to erode their power.
• Continuation of AFSPA: AFSPA should only remain in areas with high insurgency levels. The Meghalaya High Court (2015) ruled that AFSPA is necessary until incidents like abductions and killings cease entirely.
• De-induction of Armed Forces: Districts with restored peace should be handed over to civilian administration.
• Minimizing Use of Armed Forces: Reduce dependency on the Armed Forces for operational purposes in regions with a reduced threat, to avoid alienation.

2. Socio-cultural Reforms

• Emphasis on Identity: The North-East is a mosaic of various tribes, ethnicities, languages, and customs. Policies should focus on maintaining individual identities while avoiding fragmentation.
• Increased Socio-Economic Development: Infrastructure projects such as roads, schools, and sanitation facilities are critical to fostering unity and progress in the region.

3. Governance Reforms

• Continued Efforts by Civil Society: Engaging civil society in reconciliation with insurgent groups promotes a win-win outcome for all stakeholders.
• Sanctity of Indo-Myanmar International Border (IB): India shares a 1,400 km border with Myanmar. Strengthening border management is necessary to prevent insurgent infiltration.
• Using Non-Police Components: Leveraging administrative and civil society organizations to address conflicts requires greater attention.
• Autonomy: Greater autonomy to Scheduled and Tribal areas can reduce alienation and foster inclusive governance.
• Multi-Stakeholder Negotiation: Dialogue involving all stakeholders ensures sustainable solutions.

 

4. Other Measures

• Regional Cooperation: Joint operations with neighboring countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh to target insurgent safe havens.
  • Example: Myanmar and Bangladesh have increased efforts to root out insurgents from their territories.
• Economic Development: Promoting local tourism and economic activities by creating infrastructure such as roads and communication networks.

 

JAMMU AND KASHMIR INSURGENCY

The insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir represents resistance to the Indian administration in the region. It has been a contentious issue between India and Pakistan since 1947.

Data Stone-Pelting Incidents: Incidents decreased from 1,999 in 2019 to 255 in 2020. Militants Killed: In 2020, 225 militants (including 37 foreigners) were killed in joint operations, compared to 154 in 2019 (35 foreigners). Foreign Terrorists: Infiltrations dropped from 130 in 2019 to only 30 from January to October 2020.

Reasons for Insurgency

1. Increasing Penetration of Technology:

• ICT and Social Media: Throughout the lockdown, extremist propaganda continued through platforms like Telegram, Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp using VPN servers.
• Use of Drones: With the LoC (Line of Control) gateways shut, Pakistan-backed militants resorted to using drones to drop weapons along the LoC.
  • Example: In June 2020, the BSF shot down a Pakistani drone loaded with weapons in the Kathua district near the Jammu region.

2. Role of Pakistan: Pakistan’s involvement in fostering insurgency remains significant.

• ISI’s Role: The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan sponsors terrorism in Kashmir and oversees terrorist separatist groups (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011).
• Mujahideen Influence: After the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, Mujahideen fighters aided by Pakistan were diverted to Kashmir to spread radical Islamist ideology.
• Providing Manpower: Pakistan revived Al Badr, a previously defunct terror group, and also helped establish The Resistance Front (TRF), a new militant outfit to create further disturbances in the Kashmir Valley.

3. Governance-Related Issues

• 1987 State Elections: Allegations of election rigging led to the insurgency, with the Muslim United Front securing only 4 seats despite widespread support.
• New Domicile Rule: Concerns about the new rule potentially reserving lower-level jobs for locals and opening higher-level positions for outsiders.
• Excesses by Police: Police actions under the Public Safety Act (PSA) and UAPA have led to perceptions of injustice. In 2020, 635 over-ground workers were arrested, with 56 booked under PSA.
• Other Governance Issues: Declining credibility of political parties and administrative inefficiency.

4. Dissatisfaction Among the Population

• Collective Punishment: Internet shutdowns and other punitive measures have caused widespread alienation.
• Sense of Injustice: Perceptions of civilian killings lead to new militant recruitment.
• Other Issues: New domicile rules, frequent frisking, and misuse of power by police contribute to public dissatisfaction.

5. Other Reasons

• Ideological Reasons: Militant groups leverage the belief that actions, such as the abrogation of Article 370, align with the Hindutva movement’s goals.
• Irresponsible Media: Media coverage has created a divide between Kashmiris, New Delhi, and the rest of India.
• Unemployment and Radicalization: High unemployment and religious radicalization exacerbate the situation.

 

Measures Taken by the Government

1. Legislative Measures

• Repeal of Article 370: Revoked the special status of Jammu & Kashmir, allowing Indian citizens from other states to purchase property in the region.
• Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019: Reorganized Jammu & Kashmir into two Union Territories: Jammu & Kashmir (with a legislature) and Ladakh.

2. Schemes

• NISHTHA (National Initiative for School Heads’ and Teachers’ Holistic Advancement): A teacher training program to improve the quality of school education.
• Himayat Mission: Provides sustainable livelihood opportunities for the youth of Jammu & Kashmir through holistic development programs.
• Udaan Scheme: Focuses on skill development for unemployed youth, covering graduates, postgraduates, and diploma holders to enhance employability.
• Nai Manzil: An integrated Education and Livelihood Initiative for Minority Communities. Aims to benefit school dropouts or those educated in Madrasas by providing formal education (up to Class VIII or X) and skill training with certification.

3. Other Measures

• Ban on Funeral Rallies: Since June 2020, the ban on funeral rallies of slain militants has prevented terror organizations from using emotionally charged occasions as recruitment channels.
• Internet Restrictions: Curtailing internet speed to 2G from 4G minimized the spread of misinformation and radical content.
• Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy: Well-received policy where, in 2020, eight militants surrendered during encounters, and over 50 surrendered quietly.
• Grievance Redressal: State forces, especially Army officials, have been reaching out to people to address grievances.
  • Example: In February 2021, the Army organized a youth interaction program under Mission Pehal in Pulwama.

 

Way Forward

1. Dialogue and Engagement

• Contact and Engagement: Policies should address all dimensions of contact and engagement beyond military measures, focusing on the human mind and its conditioning.
• Engaging Various Stakeholders: Involve drivers and actors of conflict through community-led organizations to tackle radicalization and recruitment.
• Positive Environment: Build trust through acknowledgment and recognition to counter the narrative of ‘victim vs. perpetrator.’
  • Example: A theater workshop for 15 young stone-pelters in Kashmir helped them express their emotions, countering extremist thoughts.
• Use of Online Platforms: Create spaces for countering violent narratives online, as insurgencies increasingly use these platforms.
• Restoration of Peace: Utilize credible individuals to form Councils of Elders working with Mohalla, Village elders, and local mosque leaders to restore peace.

 

2. Security-Related Measures

• Smart Border Management System: Prevent border infiltration and protect against militants in neighboring countries.
• Coordination and Intelligence Sharing: Enhance coordination between central and state forces for better tactical responses.

3. Policy Measures

• Conflict Resolution Approach: Distinguish between “Conflict in Kashmir” and “Conflict over Kashmir.” Resolving the former will mitigate the latter, requiring balanced strategies combining hard and soft tactics.
• Zero-Tolerance Policy: Address insurgents with a zero-tolerance approach while offering surrender options to non-hardliners.
• Zero Tolerance of Human Rights Abuse: Address misuse of powers under AFSPA promptly, ensuring justice for victims and penalizing culprits.

4. International Cooperation

• Using international forums: Forums such as SAARC and SCO can be used to enhance cooperation and find solution to Kashmir situation. 

5. Recommendations by Professor Amitabh Matoo:

• Dialogue: Engage in unconditional and continuous dialogue between state and non-state actors.
• Demilitarization: Essential to advance dialogue and reconciliation.
• Devolution: Distribute power among Jammu, Ladakh, and Kashmir to foster unity and prevent polarization.
• Development: Ensure active participation of Kashmiri people in development efforts.

Great Kalhana in Rajatarangini said: “Kashmir can be won by power of spirit (love) but not by the sword (force).” While political integration of Kashmir is achieved, the emotional integration into the national mainstream remains a challenge.

OVER GROUND WORKERS (OGWs)

Over ground workers (OGWs) are people who help militants, or terrorists, with logistical support, cash, shelter, and other infrastructure with which armed groups and insurgency movements such as can operate. 

Earlier, OGWs were primarily involved in logistics support and intelligence gathering. Of late distinction has blurred with OGWs diversifying into other roles such as stone-pelting, mob-rioting, ideological support, radicalisation, and recruitment of militants.

 

Data OGWs in Kashmir: In 2020, 635 OGWs were arrested, and 56 jailed under the Public Safety Act (Crime Gazette).

Importance/Role of OGWs

• Real-Time Information: They provide tactical information to militants, aiding attacks.
• Backbone of Militancy: Act as the eyes and ears of militants.
• Provision of Logistics: Manage travel and other logistics for militants, often more critical than armed personnel.
• Ability to Blend: Carry out small-scale strikes while blending rapidly with local populations.
• Communication and Recruitment: Facilitate strategic recruitment and communication for handlers in J&K.
• Developing Negative Sentiment: Work persistently to create and spread negative narratives.
• Recruitment: Engage in systematic radicalization and recruitment of youth into militant activities.

 

Categorization of OGWs

To counter OGWs effectively, it is essential to categorize their roles:

• OGWs for Logistic Support (OGWLS): Support strike teams.
• OGWs Managing Funding (OGWF): Handle financial resources.
• OGWs Providing Ideological Support (OGWIS): Propagate extremist ideology.
• OGWs for Radicalization Support (OGWRS): Work on indoctrination and recruitment.
• OGWs for Recruitment of Terrorists (OGWR): Directly involved in recruiting youth for militant activities.
• OGWs Generating Negative Sentiment (OGWPS): Spread discontent and negative perceptions among the public (Awaam).

 

Response Strategies for OGWs

• OGWLS and OGWF: Conduct counter-terror operations or track cyber funding and physical currency used as funds for terror.
  • Example: In 2018, Syed Salahuddin’s son was arrested by the NIA for funding terrorist activities through a Hawala racket.
• OGWIS, OGWRS, and OGWR: Use intelligence-based sting operations to expose recruiting, radicalizing, or pushing youth into militancy by providing them with weapons.
• OGWPS: Change mindsets through psychological and social rehabilitation alongside strategic communication efforts.
• Other Measures:
  • Joint Mapping: A multi-agency effort to map OGWs, terrorists, and anti-national elements to ensure the intelligence picture aligns with ground realities.
  • Use of PSA (Public Safety Act): Ideal for booking anti-national elements, but care must be taken to target only hardcore OGWs under this act.
  • Monitor Youths in Jail: Monitor the time spent by young individuals in jail to prevent interaction with hardcore terrorists or fundamentalists.
  • Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Alienation increases support for separatists and OGWs, who further influence public perception negatively. This cycle must be broken to combat terrorism effectively.

 

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

21st-century defense preparedness involves demonstrating technological strength through military exercises and testing new weapons or delivery platforms. This creates a deterrence mechanism and emphasizes the interrelation between security and technology.

Different Technological Threats

• Hybrid Warfare: Refers to using unconventional methods as part of a multi-domain warfighting approach. Aims to disrupt or disable the opponent’s actions without engaging in open hostilities.
• Biological Weapons: Biological agents, including epidemic diseases, can be weaponized to threaten public health, demoralize populations, and weaken enemy nations.
• Quantum Information: A large-scale quantum computer could decrypt most cybersecurity protocols, threatening the infrastructure securing economic and national security communications.
• Biotechnology: Could be used to create virulent pathogens targeting food supplies or populations. Genomic technology designed for personalized therapies could also identify genetic vulnerabilities for misuse.

 

Emerging Technologies and Their Implications

• Emergence of Autonomous Systems: Autonomous systems pose new risks due to their dependence on software, computing, and connectivity, increasing their vulnerability to malicious cyber actors.
• Internet of Things (IoT): IoT facilitates the sharing of sensitive data at an unprecedented scale. A system breach could compromise billions of data points.
• Artificial Intelligence (AI): AI-driven cyberattacks and reliance on AI systems pose risks of over-complication and increased efficiency of terrorist planning and attacks.
• Cyber Espionage: Governments and organizations are vulnerable to breaches through illegal use of networks to access confidential information.
• Space Warfare: Involves weaponizing space by deploying weapons or creating systems that can attack targets from orbit.
• Nanotechnology: If weaponized, the atomic-level properties of nanotechnology could present a significant national security threat.
• Technological Weapons: Drones/UAVs are capable of reconnaissance, spoofing, and distracting security forces.

 

Security Challenges Posed by Technologies

• Difficult to Handle: Modern warfare includes covert operations, psy-ops, and proxy wars, making technology-driven conflict complex and unpredictable.
  • Example: In 2009, the GhostNet cyber-espionage network targeted Indian embassies and Tibetan organizations.
• Invisible Enemy: Cyber adversaries remain invisible, operating in cyberspace and leveraging social media across borderless networks.
• Increased Dependence on Technology: As reliance on virtual systems grows, vulnerabilities to cyberattacks escalate.
  • Example: Hackers exploiting nuclear or energy grids could cause catastrophic damage.
• Changing Nature of Security: The traditional focus of security has expanded to address technological developments such as AI and space-based threats.
• Lack of Regulation: Innovation in technology is outpacing regulatory frameworks, leaving many systems beyond governmental oversight.
• Remote Attacks: Cyberattacks can now be executed from any global location.
  • Example: In 2016, Mirai malware launched a DDoS attack on a prominent security website.
• More Potent Terrorist Threats: Terrorists could exploit nuclear facilities or material for significant damage.
• Threat of Nuclear Warfare: Involvement of non-state actors in targeting critical infrastructure could escalate conflicts to nuclear levels.
• Complex Security Landscape: The Internet of Things (IoT) combined with Cyber-Physical Systems has created interconnected vulnerabilities.
  • Example: The 2020 Mumbai power outage was suspected to be linked to a state-sponsored Chinese cyberattack.
• Dual-Use Technologies: Many technologies serve both military and civilian applications, complicating their regulation.
• Lack of Trained Manpower: Managing advanced technologies demands specialized personnel, and this shortage remains a significant hurdle.
• National Security vs. Privacy: Governments have a well-accepted norm to intercept electronic communications to prevent threats to national security. However, misuse is also possible.

• Example: The Pegasus affair highlighted the ongoing debate about privacy vs. national security.

 

Benefits of Technology in National Security

1. More Time to Respond with Satellite Technology: Satellite technology helps monitor adversaries, giving governments more time to respond to threats and challenges.
2. Increasing Real-Time Intelligence: Large datasets analyzed with AI provide actionable intelligence for security agencies.
3. Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Systems: These systems extend the military’s geographical reach and operational efficiency.
   • Example: Drones/UAVs enhance border security without risking soldiers’ lives.
4. Logistical Abilities: IoT ensures continuous monitoring of border infrastructure and provides insights for maintenance and repairs.
5. Replacing Humans in Hazardous Tasks: Robots and autonomous systems perform dangerous jobs, freeing humans for complex cognitive tasks.
   • Example: Cleaning environments contaminated by chemical weapons.
6. Cyber Security: AI tools improve defense capabilities by reducing the workload of security agencies monitoring cyberspace.

 

Steps Taken by the Government

1. Institutional Measures

• National Centre for Excellence in Technology for Internal Security (NCETIS): At IIT-Bombay, in collaboration with the Union Home Ministry, it develops technology solutions for both conventional and non-conventional threats.
• National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT): Supports communication upgrades for the BSF (₹220 crore project) and CRPF’s technical needs.
• Defense AI Council (DAIC): A high-level council under the Defense Minister responsible for:
  • Strategic direction for AI-driven defense transformation.
  • Guidance on data sharing and strategic partnerships with industry.
  • Reviewing recommendations for technology acquisition and safe AI usage in defense.
  • Formulating policies to deter misuse in partnership with industries.
• Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR): A DRDO laboratory focusing on AI-driven solutions for intelligence collation and armed forces’ operational needs.

2. Technological Measures

• EMISAT Satellite: Helps with surveillance and degradation of hostile equipment.

• Mission Shakti: India conducted an anti-satellite missile test in low earth orbit (LEO), becoming the fourth country to acquire such a capability. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) emphasized this as a means to safeguard India’s space assets.
• Military Technology: Successful manufacturing of a variety of arms, ammunition, aircraft, and warships.
  • Examples: 155 mm Dhanush Gun, Pinaka Multiple Barrel Rocket Launcher, Advanced Light Helicopter Dhruv, Tejas fighter aircraft, and Arjun main battle tank.
• Missile Technology: Developed under the Integrated Guided Missile Programme, inducting missiles like AGNI, AKAASH, PRITHVI, and BRAHMOS.
• Licensed Production: India manufactures T-72 and T-90 tanks, Ultra-Light Howitzers, and warships, including aircraft carriers and submarines.
• Cyber Swachhta Kendra: A platform introduced for internet users to clean their computers and devices by eliminating viruses and malware.

3. Policies and Strategies

• National Cyber Security Strategy 2020: The government is formulating provisions for securing cyberspace in India. This policy awaits cabinet approval and public release.
• Cyber Crisis Management Plan (CCMP): Focuses on countering cyber threats and cyber terrorism.

 

Way Forward

1. Scientific Advisor to the Union Home Minister: Similar to the Defense Ministry, this role would focus on addressing relevant aspects of technological challenges in national security.
2. Training of Armed Forces: Dual roles in hybrid warfare to protect civilians and disable the enemy:

• Special battle techniques and stress conditioning for urban combat.
• Training in the use of advanced tools like smart robots and UAVs.
• Utilizing Real-Time Situational Awareness (RTSA) tools for precise operations.

3. Use of ICT: Leverage India’s strength in Information Technology to develop robust offensive and defensive cyber warfare capabilities. Engage academia, private industries, and the younger talent pool.
4. National Academy of Intelligence: Establish a top-tier training institution to serve as a center of excellence in intelligence and national security.
5. Essential Reforms:

• Induct Emerging Technologies: Acknowledge the urgency of integrating emerging technologies in security frameworks.
• Capacity and Expertise: Build expertise on the technology-security nexus.
• Break Silos and Legacy Systems: Align diplomatic, security, legal, and ethical objectives with contemporary systems.
• Collaboration: Engage the private sector and academia to drive innovation and develop effective advisory mechanisms for future procurement processes.

 

Conclusion

• Technology serves as a force multiplier with significant potential to counter next-generation threats.
• India’s comprehensive national power relies on adapting and modernizing to address evolving security challenges effectively.